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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act mandates that state 
reimbursement rates for participating Medicaid providers be consistent with 
(1) efficiency, (2) economy, (3) access to health care, and (4) quality health 
care.
1
 These four nebulous factors have produced discordant interpretations 
by federal courts reviewing the validity of state Medicaid reimbursement 
                                                 
*  Law Clerk, Hon. Kenneth J. Meyers, United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern 
District of Illinois. This Article does not necessarily represent the views of any judges of the 
Southern District of Illinois. This Article would not have been possible without the 
inspiration, guidance, and support provided by Professor Sidney Watson, Saint Louis 
University Center for Health Law Studies. All errors are my own. 
1 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2014). The terms “rates” and “reimbursement 
rates” as used in this Article refer to the payment of Medicaid-participating health care 
providers. “Rate setting” refers to the states determination of Medicaid reimbursement rates. 
1
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rates, resulting in a lack of uniformity in the statute’s interpretation.
2
 The 
United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Douglas v. Independent 
Living Center of Southern California, Inc. added a degree of uniformity to 
rate setting litigation with its suggestion that rate setting plaintiffs challenge 
rate adjustments under the judicial review procedures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).
3
 The APA provides litigants with a secure cause of 
action and consistent standards of review, allowing for more unanimity in 
judicial assessments of § 30(A).
4
 
Douglas, however, did not solve all problems. Section 30(A) 
requires that states determine their rate adjustments’ effects on all four of the 
statute’s factors.
5
 Rate setting litigation, however, has focused almost 
exclusively on § 30(A)’s access requirement.
6
 Accordingly, Medicaid 
providers and beneficiaries argue that rate reductions reduce provider 
participation in Medicaid, thus lowering beneficiaries’ access to care.
7
 The 
statute’s first two factors, efficiency and economy, address the need to cap 
reimbursement rates at economical levels and therefore do not generally 
interest plaintiffs.
8
 The quality of care received by Medicaid beneficiaries is 
an important health care concern that implicates all provider settings and 
patient experiences.
9
 Notably, however, quality of care has been given scant 
                                                 
2 See infra note 84 and accompanying text (noting the varying approaches 
employed by the federal appellate courts in interpreting § 30(A) prior to the Court’s decision 
in Douglas). 
3 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012); 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2014) et seq. Medicaid providers, including 
physicians and skilled nursing facilities, and beneficiaries challenge state Medicaid 
reimbursement rates they believe are too low to adequately compensate providers for their 
services, and therefore risk affecting provider participation rates in the Medicaid program. See 
Nicole Huberfeld, Where There is a Right, There Must be a Remedy (Even in Medicaid), 102 
KY. L. J. 327, 348 (2014) (writing that “[w]hen providers are dissatisfied with the state 
payment levels and methodologies, they typically will first appeal to the state’s Medicaid 
agency. If that is unsuccessful, then providers will team up with patients to enjoin the state’s 
low payment rates in federal court.”). 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 79–82 (discussing the consistency provided 
when actions are brought under the APA). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). 
6 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the access-centric approach employed by 
reviewing courts). 
7 See, e.g., Memisovski ex rel. Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 WL 
1878332, at *41 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 23, 2004) (summarizing the plaintiffs’ contentions that “(1) 
the law requires that Medicaid reimbursement rates paid to health care providers be sufficient 
to provide Medicaid recipients access to health care equal to that of the generally insured 
population; (2) the arbitrary and capricious manner in which the defendants set reimbursement 
rates has resulted in rates that are far too low to result in equal access to care; and (3) plaintiffs 
endure obstacles to finding care not faced by privately insured patients and, as a result, the 
health problems they experience are both more acute and more preventable”). 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 61, 167 (explaining that § 30(A)’s first two 
factors set the federal ceiling for reimbursement rates to Medicaid providers). 
9 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 1 (7th 
ed. 2013) (explaining that “[c]ost, quality, access, and choice are the chief concerns of the 
health care system”). 
2
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attention by courts and the state and federal governments in their setting and 
review of reimbursement rates.
10
 
In Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Secretary U.S. Department of HHS, 
however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals became the first court to 
emphasize § 30(A)’s quality prong.
11
 In Christ the King, the court 
invalidated nursing home rate adjustments proposed by the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania due to the complete absence of any examination of the rate 
adjustment’s effects on the quality of care produced by the affected 
institutions.
12
 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was the first post-Douglas 
federal appellate court to invalidate a state’s rate setting proposal. 
After providing background as to the current state of Medicaid and 
its reimbursement programs, this article suggests that the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals’ decision in Christ the King indicates that, consistent with           
§ 30(A), quality is a truly independent statutory factor that must be 
accounted for when setting Medicaid provider reimbursement rates.
13
 
Furthermore, Christ the King delineates helpful guidelines for states, and 
CMS, in accounting for quality in their rate setting proposals going 
forward.
14
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Part II.A provides a brief overview of the Medicaid program and the 
state rate setting process.
15
 Part II.B discusses § 30(A)’s statutory 
requirements and Douglas’s role in providing a measure of uniformity in      
§ 30(A) litigation in order to illuminate the changing direction of Medicaid 
rate setting law.
16
 Part II.B further discusses the access-centric approach that 
has marked much of rate setting litigation, and the lack of focus states and 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have placed on           
§ 30(A)’s quality prong.
17
 Part II.C examines the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Christ the King, concluding that the decision’s importance lies in its 
emphasis on § 30(A)’s quality of care prong, rather than exclusively access, 
                                                 
10 See infra Part II.B.3 (illustrating the absence of quality of care analysis that 
results from the access-centric approach). 
11 Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Secretary U.S. Department of HHS, 730 F.3d 
291 (3d Cir. 2013).  
12 Id. at 309–14. 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 164–171 (discussing the need to analyze 
quality after Christ the King). 
14 See infra Part III.A–C (discussing guidelines provided by Christ the King in the 
assessment of quality as an independent factor in § 30(A)). The reviewing federal agency is 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), a division of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), which is tasked with ensuring that state plans comply with the 
Medicaid Act. Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 297. 
15 See infra Part II.A. 
16 See infra Part II.B. 
17 See infra Part II.B. 
3
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indicating that quality of care is a truly independent factor in the § 30(A) 
calculus that must be considered by states, CMS, and courts.
18
 
A.  Medicaid and State Rate Setting 
The Medicaid program is vital to the provision of medical assistance 
to many of the nation’s disadvantaged.
19
 The flexibility provided to states 
under Medicaid, however, allows states to cut provider reimbursement rates 
in the face of bulging Medicaid rolls caused by high under- and 
unemployment.
20
 Low reimbursement causes correspondingly low provider 
participation in Medicaid, which inexorably leads to barriers to accessible 
and quality health care.
21
 This section broadly summarizes the Medicaid 
program and examines the process of and problems with state Medicaid rate 
setting. 
1.  The Medicaid Program 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state health insurance program, financed 
by the federal and state governments, and administered by the states.
22
 
Codified at Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid program 
provides medical assistance to over 60 million disadvantaged children, 
pregnant women, disabled individuals, seniors, and individuals newly 
eligible under the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid Expansion.
23
 A 
product of the Spending Clause, the federal government funds a portion of 
each state’s Medicaid program on the condition that each state provide 
specific medical benefits to mandatory categories of individuals.
24
 The 
                                                 
18 See infra Part II.C. 
19 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1208 (noting that “Medicaid is a cooperative federal-
state program that provides medical care to needy individuals.”). 
20 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing state rate setting generally). 
21 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing state rate adjustments’ effects on access and 
quality). 
22 Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Moving Forward, 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., at 1 (June 2014), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2014/06/7235-07-medicaid-moving-forward2.pdf. (discussing Medicaid generally). 
23 42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq.; Renee M. Landers & Patrick A. Leeman, Medicaid 
Expansion under the 2010 Health Care Reform Legislation: The Continuing Evolution of 
Medicaid’s Central Role in American Health Care, 7 NAELA J. 143, 143, 146 (2010) (listing 
the populations covered by Medicaid prior to the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion); Sidney D. 
Watson, Embracing Justice Roberts’ “New Medicaid,” 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
247, 255–56 (2013) (discussing newly eligible individuals under the ACA’s Medicaid 
Expansion). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The 
Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 413, 419–
20 (2008) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle], (stating that “the federal 
government promises federal money to the states in exchange for states’ promise to fulfill 
certain conditions on those funds by providing medical assistance to mandatory categories of 
people”). To help ease the financial burden on the states, the federal government matches a 
4
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bedrock of the country’s safety net system, Medicaid is necessary for the 
provision of medical and other health services to the nation’s most 
underprivileged citizens.
25
 
States are given wide flexibility in administering and financing their 
Medicaid programs.
26
 This flexibility includes the authority to decide the 
level of participating Medicaid providers’ payments. 
27
 While federal law 
requires that each state’s program provide for specific mandatory benefits 
and eligibility categories, states are free to cover certain optional benefits and 
categories of individuals.
28
 States may also seek waivers from federal law to 
use federal funds for demonstration or other purposes.
29
 
States memorialize their Medicaid programs in a state plan, which is 
submitted to CMS for approval.
30
 A state must submit a state plan 
amendment (SPA) to CMS if it makes any material changes, such as 
adjusting provider reimbursement rates, to its plan for medical assistance.
31
 
                                                                                                                   
percentage of state Medicaid payments. FURROW, supra note 9, at 828 (stating that the federal 
government funds a portion of each states’ Medicaid program). This match, known as the 
federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), ranges from 50–74%, depending on each 
state’s per capita income. Id. at 836; Landers & Leeman, supra note 23, at 147 (stating that 
federal assistance ranges 50–76%). The FMAP for Medicaid expenditures for the newly 
eligible population is 100%, as of last January 1, 2014, through 2016, and will decrease 
incrementally until 2020, in which the FMAP for such newly eligible individuals will remain 
constant at 90%. Id. at 152–54 (explaining the enhanced FMAP under the Medicaid 
Expansion). 
25 See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 24, at 419 (stating that 
“Medicaid is not perfect (or philosophically coherent), but it is indispensable as the most 
consistent device that ensures access to healthcare for underprivileged populations”); Brietta 
R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the Obama Administration 
is Undermining its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L. J. 771, 784–85 (2012) [hereinafter 
Rate Setting and Payment Suits] (discussing the benefits and effectiveness of the Medicaid). 
26 Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services,76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26342 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
447) (noting that State Medicaid Programs “have considerable flexibility”). 
27 Id. (discussing State Medicaid Programs generally). 
28 See Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 778 n.16 (noting that 
“the law gives states the option of covering additional services, such as private nursing, adult 
dental, and physical, occupational, and speech therapy”). Optional benefits include mental and 
dental care, and optional categories of individuals include the “medically needy.” Id. 
29 Watson, supra note 23, at 250 n.18 (citing § 1115 of the Social Security Act, 
which grants “the Secretary of Health and Human Services broad authority to waive statutory 
and regulatory provisions of health and welfare programs, like Medicaid”). The Secretary of 
HHS may approve demonstration projects that allow states to provide services or cover 
individuals otherwise prohibited by federal law. Watson, supra note 23, at 250. 
30 42 C.F.R. § 430.10, et seq. (regulating SPAs); see also Megan Waugh, A 
Broke(n) System: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Decision to Rule on the Equal Access 
Provision in Douglas v. Independent Living Center, and its Potential Impact on the Affordable 
Care Act, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 855, 859–60 (2012) (discussing the 
Medicaid Program generally and state plan submissions to HHS). 
31 42 C.F.R. § 430.12 (providing procedural guidelines for SPA submissions); 
Waugh, supra note 30, at 861 (stating that “[i]f a state makes a material change to the law, 
organization, policy or operation within the Medicaid program, a state must file an SPA with 
the CMS”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
5
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CMS must review each plan and SPA to determine whether a state’s 
Medicaid program complies with federal law.
32
 This process is devoid of any 
formal procedures, and many SPAs are given only cursory review.
33
 
2.  State Rate Setting 
Each state’s Medicaid program relies on the participation of private 
health care providers to treat Medicaid patients.
34
 However, pursuant to the 
flexibility they enjoy under Medicaid, states frequently reduce provider rates 
in poor economic times when, due to a rise in unemployment, Medicaid rolls 
increase.
35
 This increase in enrollment strains state budgets, causing them to 
seek ways to make up for the decrease in tax revenues caused by increased 
unemployment.
36
 Rather than cut eligibility, a politically unpopular move, 
states instead reduce provider payment rates.
37
 A 50-state survey conducted 
by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured reported that in 
2013, 38 states cut reimbursement rates of some kind.
38
 
                                                 
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (“The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills 
the conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section [delineating SPA requirements]”). 
33 Brietta Clark, The (In)decision of Douglas v. ILC: The Relevance of CMS 
Approval in Challenges to Medicaid Payment Cuts, HEALTH CARE JUSTICE BLOG (Feb. 29, 
2012), http://healthcarejusticeblog.org/2012/02/us_supreme_cour.html (writing that 
“[r]eviews of state plans have been cursory, at best, and are often approved by default”). 
34 Spectrum Health Continuing Care Grp. v. Anna Marie Bowling Irrecoverable 
Trust Dated June 27, 2002, 410 F.3d 304, 313 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing the nature of the 
Medicaid program, and stating that “[a] health-care provider is not required to participate in 
the Medicaid program, but rather voluntarily contracts with the state to provide services to 
Medicaid-eligible patients in return for reimbursement from the state at the specified rates”). 
35 See Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 774 (discussing the 
flexibility Congress gave the states in setting rates); Vernon K. Smith et al., Medicaid in a 
Historic Time of Transformation: Results from a 50-State Medicaid Budget Survey for State 
Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., at 47 (Oct. 2013) [hereinafter Smith, FY 
2013–14], http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/8498-medicaid-in-a-
historic-time-of-transformation.pdf. (explaining that states cut rates to control costs during the 
Great Recession and the 2001–2004 economic downturn). 
36 See Vernon K. Smith et al., Moving Ahead Among Fiscal Challenges: A Look 
at Medicaid Spending, Coverage and Policy Trends, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., at 15 (Oct. 
2011), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8248.pdf [hereinafter 
Smith, FY 2011–2012] (writing that “[d]uring an economic downturn, high unemployment 
puts upward pressure on Medicaid. As individuals lose jobs and their incomes decline, more 
individuals qualify and enroll in Medicaid which increases program spending.”). 
37 Abigail Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the “Equal 
Access” Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 673 (2006) (stating that “[s]tates . . . are hesitant to 
push for large-scale reductions in eligibility or benefits because excluding needy people from 
existing welfare programs is politically unattractive and may be financially unwise”); Smith, 
FY 2011–2012, supra note 35, at 31 (explaining that states reduce provider payments during 
economic downturns). 
38 Smith, FY 2013–2014, supra note 35, at 47–48 (discussing state rate cuts in 
2013). The ACA temporarily prevented states from decreasing primary care physician rates, 
beginning in 2013. Id. at 48. While 40 states reported increasing rates for some providers in 
6
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Rate adjustments that cause low reimbursement levels have a direct 
impact on access to provider services and quality of care.
39
 Nationally, 
Medicaid physician rates are 66% that of Medicare.
40
 Provider participation 
in Medicaid is voluntary, but is also low: physician participation in Medicaid 
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is 75% nationally, 
lower than Medicare, which causes resultant barriers to access to care.
41
 One 
study found that 95% of physicians who did not participate in Medicaid cited 
low reimbursement as the reason.
42
 In 2011, only about 69% of participating 
physicians accepted new Medicaid patients.
43
 The expansion of Medicaid 
under the ACA may portend further drops in participation.
44
 
Low Medicaid reimbursement also has detrimental effects on 
quality. Low rates lead to low nursing home staffing levels, which lead to 
concomitant decreases in the quality of nursing home care.
45
 Further, there is 
                                                                                                                   
2013 the magnitude of some rate cuts is alarming: California and Maine, for example, cut 
outpatient reimbursement rates by 10%. Id. at 47–49. 
39 See Smith, FY 2011–2012, supra note 36, at 31 (stating that”[p]rovider rates 
are an important determinant of provider participation and access to services for Medicaid 
beneficiaries, so cutting Medicaid rates (which are typically lower than Medicare or 
commercial insurance) can jeopardize provider participation in the program as well as 
access”); Brietta R. Clark, APA Deference after Independent Living Center: Why Informal 
Adjudicatory Action Needs a Hard Look, 102 KY. L. J. 211, 217 (2014) [hereinafter APA 
Deference after Independent Living Center] (stating that rate cuts decrease provider 
participation in Medicaid and therefore endanger beneficiaries’ access to Medicaid services). 
40 Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Index, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org
/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-to-medicare-fee-index/ (last visited March 20, 2014). 
41 State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2014) et seq.; 
Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 15, 20 (2013) 
(explaining that Medicaid is voluntary for states and providers); FURROW, supra note 9, at 
850–51 (writing that “Medicaid only pays physicians about 72% of what Medicare pays” and 
that physician participation in Medicaid and CHIP is about three-quarters nationally); Smith, 
FY 2011–2012, supra note 36, at 31 (noting that “cutting Medicaid rates (which are typically 
lower than Medicare or commercial insurance) can jeopardize provider participation in the 
program as well as access”); Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 785–86 (stating 
that low physician participation in Medicaid “impedes access to regular, preventive care”). 
42 Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 786 (citing U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID AND CHIP: MOST PHYSICIANS SERVE COVERED CHILDREN 
BUT HAVE DIFFICULTY REFERRING THEM FOR SPECIALTY CARE 18 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11624.pdf.). 
43 Sandra L. Decker, In 2011 Nearly One-Third of Physicians Said They Would 
Not Accept New Medicaid Patients, But Rising Fees May Help, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1673, 1675 
(2011) (noting that approximately 69% of participating physicians accepted new Medicaid 
patients in 2011). 
44 Abby Goodnough, Medicaid Growth Could Aggravate Doctor Shortage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2013, at A1 (reporting that many physicians may refuse to accept new patients 
under the Medicaid Expansion due to low reimbursement rates). 
45 See Charlene Harrington et al., Nurse Staffing Levels and Medicaid 
Reimbursement Rates in Nursing Facilities, 42 HEALTH SERV. RESEARCH 1105, 1124 (2011) 
(reporting the results of a study that were consistent with earlier findings in which nursing 
“facilities with higher proportions of Medicaid residents had fewer nurses and consequently . . 
. appeared to have lower quality of care”). 
7
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evidence that some of the participating Medicaid providers provide a degree 
of care lower than that provided by those who primarily treat Medicare and 
privately insured patients.
46
 
B.  Section 30(A) and State Rate Setting Litigation 
Section 30(A) of the Medicaid program provides the authority by 
which Medicaid providers and beneficiaries challenge state Medicaid rate 
adjustments.
47
 Bereft of a private right of action, plaintiffs have traditionally 
enforced the Medicaid Act’s provisions, including § 30(A), with 42 U.S.C.   
§ 1983, a civil rights statute, or the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.
48
 The Supreme Court, in Douglas, suggested an alternative 
vehicle through which to enforce § 30(A)—the judicial review provisions of 
the APA.
49
 The APA allows for a degree of uniformity that had been absent 
in rate setting litigation.
50
 Decisions both before and after Douglas have 
focused mainly on the access requirement imposed by § 30(A), giving less 
weight to the provision’s quality prong.
51
 This access-centric trend, however, 
has been upset by the Christ the King decision’s focus on quality.
52
 This 
section contains an overview of § 30(A) litigation, the Douglas decision, and 
rate setting litigation’s predominate focus on access.
53
 
1.  Section 30(A) 
Congress enacted § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act in 1989 to prevent 
states from arbitrarily reducing Medicaid reimbursement rates.
54
 Since the 
1997 repeal of a similar rate setting provision, the Boren Amendment, 
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have challenged Medicaid rate 
adjustments under § 30(A), first through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and following the 
                                                 
46 See FURROW, supra note 9, at 851 (noting that many Medicaid beneficiaries 
receive substandard physician services). 
47 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing § 30(A) generally). 
48 See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining that § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause have 
historically served as the basis for rate setting litigation). 
49 See infra text accompany notes 79–82 (discussing the Court’s suggestion in 
Douglas that aggrieved plaintiffs proceed under the APA). 
50 See infra text accompanying note 82 (discussing the consistency provided 
when actions are brought under the APA). 
51 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the access-centric approach employed by 
reviewing courts). 
52 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 
Christ the King). 
53 See infra Parts II.A–C. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A); Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 
800–01 (noting that § 30(A) was enacted “to ensure that state flexibility in rate-setting did not 
result in state disregard for federal protections with respect to the adequacy of rates, and their 
impact on access and quality”). 
8
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Supreme Court’s near-foreclosure of § 1983,
 55
 the Supremacy Clause
56
 and 
the APA.
57
 While CMS may withhold funds from states for violating            
§ 30(A), the agency is deservedly reluctant to impose a penalty that would 
most affect individuals dependent on governmental funding for their medical 
care.
58
 Therefore, litigation is a crucial tool through which to enforce the 
Medicaid Acts’ requirements. 
Section 30(A) mandates that a state’s Medicaid plan: 
[P]rovide such methods and procedures relating to the 
utilization of, and payment for, care and services available 
                                                 
55 Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 802–03 (discussing the 
repeal of the Boren Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982)). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . . 
Section 1983 is a particularly attractive statute through which to enforce civil rights because a 
companion statute provides winning plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C.          
§ 1988(b) (2014). However, in 2002, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzaga 
University v. Doe impeded the ability to bring § 1983 claims under the Spending Clause. 536 
U.S. 273, 280 (2001) (holding that § 1983 confers a right to privately enforce a Spending 
Clause statute only where the statute in question “manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to confer 
individual rights”). See also infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the federal 
circuit court split on this issue). 
56 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Martina Brendel, When a Door Closes, a Window 
Opens Up: Using Preemption to Challenge State Medicaid Cutbacks, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
925, 926–27 (2011) (discussing the Supremacy Clause as an alternative means to enforce       
§ 30(A) in absence of § 1983). 
57 See, e.g., Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 
2013) (plaintiffs challenging reimbursement rate reductions under the APA and the 
Supremacy Clause); Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 296 (3d Cir. 2013) (plaintiff challenging 
reimbursement rate reductions under the APA and the Supremacy Clause). 
58 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 52 (1981) (White, 
J., dissenting) (noting that, despite the ability to cut off funds, the judicial “reluctance is 
founded on the perception that a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences 
to the supposed beneficiaries of the Act”). CMS’s authority to cut off fund is derived from 42 
U.S.C. § 1396c (2014), which states: 
If the Secretary, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the 
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State 
plan approved under this subchapter, finds— 
 (1) that the plan has been so changed that it no longer complies 
 with the provisions of section 1396a of this title; or  
 (2) that in the administration of the plan there is a failure to 
 comply substantially with any such provision;  
the Secretary shall notify such State agency that further payments will not 
be made to the State . . . . until the Secretary is satisfied that there will no 
longer be any such failure to comply. Until he is so satisfied he shall make 
no further payments to such State . . . . 
9
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under the plan . . . as may be necessary . . . to assure that 
payments are consistent with [1] efficiency, [2] economy, 
and [3] quality of care and [4] are sufficient to enlist enough 
providers so that care and services are available under the 
plan at least to the extent that such care and services are 
available to the general population in the geographic         
area . . . .
59
 
Section 30(A) sets a federal floor and ceiling for provider rates, guaranteeing 
that Medicaid beneficiaries receive accessible, quality medical care of the 
same degree as privately insured individuals in an economical and efficient 
manner.
60
 
Section 30(A)’s first two factors, efficiency and economy, serve as 
the federal ceiling for Medicaid payment rates by mandating that payments 
be no more than “necessary . . . to assure” consistency “with efficiency [and] 
economy,” and are commonly evaluated together.
61
 The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals historically focused on these two factors in interpreting § 30(A).
62
 
As such, the Ninth Circuit’s approach required, until recently, that states 
examine cost studies prior to cutting rates in order to assess how the cuts 
compared to the costs of providing Medicaid services.
63
 The cost studies 
approach included a procedural requirement that ensured a relatively 
searching level of judicial review.
64
 However, since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Douglas, patients and providers have brought § 30(A) claims in 
the Ninth Circuit against CMS under the APA, instead of merely against the 
state.
65
 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has deferred to the Department of 
Health and Human Services’ (HHS) interpretation of § 30(A), resulting in 
                                                 
59 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (emphasis added). 
60 Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 676–77 (writing that “[a]lthough the states have 
flexibility in setting the amount that they are willing to pay for healthcare services or for 
managed care coverage, Title XIX sets a ceiling and a floor on payments”). 
61 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A); Ariz. Hosp. & Health Care Ass’n v. Betlach, 865 
F. Supp. 2d 984, 995 (D. Ariz. 2012) (analyzing efficiency and economy together). See also 
Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 676–77 (implying that the efficiency and economy factors are the 
federal ceiling); APA Deference after Independent Living Center, supra note 39, at 217 
(writing that “economy and efficiency . . . are typically understood to reflect federal concerns 
about payments being too high”). 
62 See Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 678 (writing that “the Ninth Circuit has 
focused primarily on the ‘efficiency’ and ‘economy’ requirements of § 30(A), holding that 
rates violate the Medicaid statute if they do not reflect the costs of providing care, even if the 
rates are sufficient to sustain equal access”). 
63 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that rates comply with § 30(A) if they “bear a reasonable relationship to provider costs”). 
64 APA Deference after Independent Living Center, supra note 39, at 213 
(commenting that the Ninth Circuit historically applied “robust judicial review” to rate cuts). 
65 See, e.g., Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d at 1235; Ariz. Hosp. & Health 
Care Ass’n, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 984. 
10
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the abandonment of the cost studies requirement, and a near-singular focus 
on access.
66
 
Section 30(A)’s last two factors, access and quality of care, serve as 
the federal floor for payment rates.
67
 These factors require that each state’s 
Medicaid program provide patients access to quality care.
68
 Access to care in 
the United States is predominately based on access to health insurance.
69
 The 
provision of Medicaid services ensures that many Americans receive health 
care services that they would otherwise not receive.
70
 However, access to 
care is also implicated by the availability of provider services.
71
 Costs that 
are too efficient and economical deter many providers from participating in 
Medicaid, thus limiting the avenues through which beneficiaries may attain 
health services.
72
 
“Quality” health care is difficult to define. The Institute of Medicine 
defines quality care as “the degree to which health services for individuals 
and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are 
consistent with current professional knowledge.”
73
 Other definitions abound, 
but quality care at base must embody care that adequately advances patient 
welfare.
74
 Perhaps as difficult a task as defining quality is selecting the 
“correct” approach to measuring the quality of any given patient’s care. 
Should quality be measured by outcome? Patient satisfaction? Structural or 
“process” standards?
75
 Does quality depend on whether the provider at issue 
is an individual or an institution? 
                                                 
66 See Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d at 1249–51 (holding that the cost 
study’s methodology is not required by § 30(A) and providing deference to CMS’s approval 
of California’s rate cuts). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). 
68 Id. 
69 See FURROW, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that, unlike many other systems in the 
developed world that provide universal health care to citizens, the United States’ health care 
system is based on a mix of private and public insurance). 
70 See supra text accompanying notes 23–25 (noting that Medicaid is necessary to 
millions of the nation’s most underprivileged citizens). 
71 See supra text accompanying notes 39–42 (explaining that low Medicaid 
reimbursement rates cause low physician-participation in Medicaid). 
72 See supra text accompanying notes 39–42, 61 (noting the ceiling on federal 
reimbursement rates). 
73 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, 
Vol. I, 21 (K. Lohr, ed. 1990) (noting the Institute of Medicine’s definition for “quality of 
care”). 
74 See, e.g., Avedis Donabedian, The Quality of Care: How Can it be Assessed?, 
260 JAMA 1743, 1743 (1988) (writing that “the goodness of technical performance,” one 
element of quality care, “is judged in comparison with the best in practice,” which is in turn 
defined as that practice “that is known or believed to produce the greatest improvement in 
health.”). 
75 See FURROW, supra note 9, at 144–45 (describing Avedis Donabedian’s 
explanation of the three approaches to quality assessment: “structure,” “process,” and 
“outcome”). 
11
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Analyzing and measuring efficiency, economy, access, and quality is 
not always easy; however, states are required to take all four factors into 
consideration when proposing adjustments to provider payment rates.
76
 
2.  Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. 
In its 2012 decision of Douglas v. Independent Living Center of 
Southern California, Inc., the Supreme Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit 
a series of challenges to rate cuts imposed by the State of California after 
CMS belatedly approved the state’s SPAs.
77
 The Court originally granted 
certiorari to determine whether the Supremacy Clause provides a private 
right of action to enforce § 30(A).
78
 In remanding, however, the Court 
emphasized the benefits of judicial review under the APA, writing that 
CMS’s actions “may require [the plaintiffs] now to proceed by seeking 
review of the agency determination under the [APA] . . . rather than in an 
action against California under the Supremacy Clause.”
79
 The Court favored 
review under the APA primarily for reasons of certainty, agency expertise, 
and consistency.
80
 Specifically, the Court noted that the APA provides 
plaintiffs with “an authoritative judicial determination of the merits of their 
legal claim” and is uniquely equipped to guide the court in evaluating agency 
action under the Medicaid Act’s complex statutory scheme.
81
 The Court also 
wrote that review under the APA promotes judicial-agency consistency and 
uniformity by preventing discordant judicial and administrative decisions 
concerning the same issue.
82
 
Rate setting litigation had previously been marked by a degree of 
inconsistency due to the lack of agency guidance in interpreting § 30(A)’s 
factors.
83
 Uncertainty regarding the proper vehicle through which to 
                                                 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (including (1) efficiency, (2) economy, (3) 
access to health care, and (4) quality health care). 
77 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1207–08. 
78 Id. at 1208–10. 
79 Id. at 1210. 
80 See id. at 1210–11. 
81 Id. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer stated: 
The Act provides for judicial review of final agency action. It permits any 
person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action to obtain judicial 
review of the lawfulness of that action. And it requires a reviewing court 
to set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 
Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706(2)(A) (2014)). 
82 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1211. 
83 Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26344 (proposed May 6, 2011) (“We are not aware of any 
standardized, transparent methodology that is broadly accepted to definitively measure access 
to health care services. Partly as a result, there has been no prior Federal rulemaking or 
guidance previously on this subject. As a consequence, in implementing their programs, States 
lack the guidance that they need to understand the types of information that they are expected 
to analyze and monitor in determining compliance with statutory access requirements. This 
12
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challenge state rate adjustments also contributed to inconsistencies.
84
 
Plaintiffs have historically been forced to use other means to challenge 
alleged violations of  § 30(A) because the Medicaid Act does not contain a 
private right of action.
85
 Initially, plaintiffs challenged rate cuts under           
§ 1983, a civil rights statute used to vindicate state violations of federal 
constitutional and certain statutory rights.
86
 The Supreme Court’s narrow, 
and relatively recent, construction of § 1983 relating to its use as a vehicle to 
enforce Spending Clause statutes, however, has greatly limited use of that 
avenue.
87
 Plaintiffs then turned to the Supremacy Clause to vindicate their 
rights, arguing that § 30(A) preempts state rate reductions that fall below the 
floor instituted by that provision.
88
 The preemption strategy has achieved 
success in some Medicaid suits, but the Court has not yet determined its 
constitutionality.
89
 
                                                                                                                   
issue has come to light recently, both in litigation and in our review of proposed Medicaid . . . 
state plan amendments (SPAs) that would reduce provider payment rates.”). 
84 See, e.g., Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 24, at 447–50 
(describing the discordant judicial interpretations of § 1983 and its viability as a vehicle to 
enforce § 30(A)). Moreover, the federal circuit courts utilized various approaches in 
interpreting the statute before Douglas. See, e.g., Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1499 (applying the cost 
studies approach); Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(focusing on the access prong of § 30(A)); Ark. Med. Soc., Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 529 
(8th Cir.1993) (applying the “arbitrary and capricious” test). See also Moncrieff, supra note 
37, at 677–691 (providing further discussion on the judicial inconsistencies in interpreting      
§ 30(A)). 
85 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature Of The Medicaid Entitlement, 
22 HEALTH AFF. 145, 146 (2003) (noting the absence of a private right of action in the 
Medicaid Act). 
86 42 U.S.C § 1983. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 512 
(1990) (holding that the Boren Amendment was enforceable under § 1983); Jost, supra note 
85, at 146 (writing that from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court firmly 
recognized the right to enforce certain provisions of the Medicaid Act under § 1983). 
87 See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 280 (holding that § 1983 confers a right to 
privately enforce a Spending Clause statute only where the statute in question “manifests an 
unambiguous intent to confer individual rights”). Since Gonzaga Univ., the federal circuit 
courts have split on whether patients or providers, or either, may enforce § 30(A) pursuant to a 
§ 1983 action. Andrew R. Gardella, The Equal Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of 
Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private Enforcement of § 1396a(a)(30) of the 
Medicaid Act using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 697, 733–36 (2008) (discussing the 
federal circuit court split that emerged after Gonzaga). Only the Eighth Circuit has interpreted 
such a right in both beneficiaries and providers. See Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. 
Dep’t of Human Serv., 443 F.3d 1005, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that § 1983 may be used 
by both providers and patients to enforce § 30(A)). 
88 See Matthew McKennan, Medicaid Access after Health Reform: The Shifting 
Legal Basis for Equal Access, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 477, 499–503 (2011) (discussing 
use of the Supremacy Clause to enforce § 30(A)). 
89 See, e.g., Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509–13 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the Supremacy Clause likely preempted a state regulation that limited the provision of 
durable medical equipment to most categorically-needy Medicaid beneficiaries). The Ninth 
Circuit, in an early decision in the Douglas litigation, became the first federal circuit court to 
recognize a right of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce § 30(A). See Living Ctr. of 
13
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas went a long way to 
resolve the foregoing inconsistencies in the judicial arena because, consistent 
with principles of administrative law, CMS’s reasonable interpretation of     
§ 30(A)’s factors will govern the courts’ review of state rate adjustments 
under the APA.
90
 Further, the APA provides a stable means through which to 
challenge agency review of SPAs, in contrast to the present state of flux in 
which § 1983 and Supremacy Clause actions reside.
91
 However, the APA’s 
standard of review is not as searching as was the Ninth Circuit’s cost studies 
test because judicial review of informal agency adjudications (which include 
CMS SPA approvals)
92
 is governed by the deferential “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of review.
93
 Furthermore, federal agency actions are 
                                                                                                                   
S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Supremacy 
Clause may be used to enforce § 30(A)). 
90 See infra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of review). 
91 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1210 (discussing the consistency of review under the 
APA). 
92 Substantive agency action is divided into formal and informal rulemaking and 
adjudication. Formal rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings resemble trial-type 
proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2014) (“This section applies, according to the provisions 
thereof, in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing”). Informal rulemaking is governed by the notice-and-
comment provisions contained in § 553 of the APA and is typified by the promulgation of 
codified regulations. Id. § 553(b)(3), (c), (d). Informal adjudications consist of all 
particularized orders that are not subject to the APA’s formal adjudicatory provisions. See, 
e.g., Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (a tax assessment imposed on 
one neighborhood was an adjudicatory order, not a legislative rule, and so notice and a hearing 
was required prior to its imposition). See also Thomas Moore, Abandoning Mead: Why 
Informal Adjudications Should Only Receive Minimal Deference in Federal Courts, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 719, 724–25 (deducing that “adjudications target individuals or ‘a few people’ 
whereas rulemaking has a broader aim”). As such, informal adjudications, such as U.S. 
Customs Service tariff classification rulings, licensing suspensions, deportation decisions, and 
approvals of Medicaid SPAs, take varying and multifarious forms. United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (tariff classification ruling); Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n 
Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973) (licensing suspension); Salameda v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995) (deportation ruling); Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d 
1235 (Medicaid SPA approval). 
93 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2014) (providing that a court on review shall “hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” it determines to be “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). The arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review governs judicial review of, among other actions, the 
discretionary elements of informal administrative adjudications. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & 
RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 567 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review). Section 706(2)(A) Under the arbitrary and 
capricious test, if the court finds that the agency’s action was not reasonable, it generally must 
remand the issue back to the agency “for additional investigation or explanation.” Fla. Power 
& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). The court’s review of an agency’s decision-
making process may only be based on those issues that the agency actually considered. SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (stating that “[i]f an order is valid only as a 
determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which 
it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative 
14
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afforded significant deference pursuant to the doctrine set out by Chevron, 
USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc. and its progeny.
94
 Some commentators have 
expressed concern that the APA’s judicial review framework will provide 
defendants too much flexibility and deference in rate setting litigation, to the 
detriment of Medicaid beneficiaries and providers.
95
 Given the recency of the 
decision, it is too early to say whether such fears will materialize. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs are taking the Supreme Court’s advice in Douglas 
                                                                                                                   
judgment. For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court 
cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative 
agency.”). The test is intended to be deferential, while requiring that the agency exhibit 
rational decision-making. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 93, at 576–77. The Supreme 
Court famously articulated the arbitrary and capricious test in informal agency actions in 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, stating: 
[T]he court must consider whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching 
and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is 
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 
401 U.S. 402, 416–17 (1971) (internal citations omitted). An important consideration is 
whether the agency considered the “relevant factors” required by the applicable statute or 
other source of law in making its decision. Therefore, judicial review of CMS’s approval of 
state rate reductions turns on whether CMS reasonably determined that the state assessed the 
specific rate adjustments’ impact on § 30(A)’s “relevant factors” of efficiency, economy, 
quality, and access. As long as there is evidence in the administrative record sufficient to 
allow CMS to determine whether the state considered such factors, and CMS reasonably 
considered the state’s evidence, approval of the rate adjustments is not arbitrary and 
capricious. 
94 See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that 
courts must give deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes); Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. at 226–27 (holding that Chevron deference only applies to interpretations “promulgated 
in the exercise of” the agency’s congressionally delegated authority to issue rules carrying the 
force of law); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (expanding the contours of 
Mead’s analysis by advising courts to consider the following factors before applying Chevron 
deference: (1) the legal question’s interstitial nature; the agency’s expertise; (2) the 
importance of the question to the administration of the statute; (3) the level of complexity of 
administration; and (4) the careful consideration the agency has given the question over a long 
period of time). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that CMS SPA approvals 
are entitled to Chevron deference. See PhRMA v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 821–22 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (holding that Congress’s express delegation to HHS to review state Medicaid plans and 
amendments indicates congress’s intent that such case-by-case adjudications carry the force of 
law). 
95 See Lindsey Gabrielsen, California Medicaid Amendments: Supreme Court 
Vacates and Remands Supremacy Clause Private Right of Action Issue Based on Changed 
Conditions – Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 38 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 751, 753 (2012) (speculating that APA § 706(2)(A) and Chevron will render future rate 
setting litigation challenging for plaintiffs); David M. Dirr, High Court Decision Leaves 
Medicaid Providers Feeling Uneasy, 24 NO. 5 HEALTH LAW. 34, 37–38 (2012) (suggesting 
that future plaintiffs find alternative ways, aside from litigation, to challenge Medicaid rate 
cuts). 
15
Sheffner: Rate Setting After Douglas
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2015
72 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:57 
and challenging CMS’s review of state rate adjustments under the judicial 
review provisions of the APA.
96
 
3.  Access, Access, Access 
Section 30(A)’s analytical framework is conjunctive: rate 
adjustments must be consistent with efficiency, economy, quality, and 
access.
97
 The quality prong, however, has rarely been the focus of litigation, 
with most rate setting lawsuits predominately concerning access to care.
98
 In 
fact, § 30(A) is commonly referred to as the “equal access provision.”
99
 
Whether a given lawsuit primarily concerns access is, of course, dependent 
on the plaintiffs’ complaint. Even so, § 30(A) does not, given its grammatical 
structure, give states, agencies, and reviewing courts the option to ignore one 
or most of its factors.
100
 Therefore, the predominant focus on access, as 
opposed to efficiency, economy, and quality, seemingly violates Congress’s 
directive. 
The access-centric focus has not abated after Douglas. The Ninth 
Circuit considered a § 30(A) claim in Managed Pharmacy Care v. 
Sebelius.
101
 Managed Pharmacy Care concerned California’s latest foray 
into Medicaid rate cutting.
102
 While the court determined that CMS 
adequately considered § 30(A)’s requirements, its discussion mainly 
concerned the “[h]undreds of pages of analysis submitted by [California] . . . 
[concerning] beneficiary access,” including a report issued by the Medicaid 
and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC), which proposed 
the use of a § 30(A) “access framework” in evaluating compliance with the 
statute, and which was cited approvingly by the court.
103
 Similarly, in 
Arizona Hospital & Healthcare Ass’n v. Betlach, the United States District 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d at 1240 (plaintiffs challenging 
reimbursement rate reductions under the APA and the Supremacy Clause); Christ the King, 
730 F.3d at 296 (plaintiff challenging reimbursement rate reductions under the APA and the 
Supremacy Clause). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (emphasis added). 
98 See, e.g., Ariz. Hosp. & Health Care Ass’n, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 993–94; 
(focusing on access) Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 927 n.24 (5th Cir. 
2000) (focusing on access); Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1029 (focusing on access). 
99 See Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 800 (referring to the 
“equal access provision” under § 30(A)); Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 674 n.11 (noting that 
many authorities refer to § 30(A) in its entirety as the “equal access provision,” although that 
title actually only applies to that section’s access language). 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (requiring that state plans “assure that 
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to 
enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the 
extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic 
area”) (emphasis added). 
101 Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d 1235. 
102 Id. at 1239–40. 
103 Id. at 1250–51 (citing the MACPAC 2011 Report, which established a three-
part test for studying access). 
16
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Court for the District of Arizona upheld Arizona’s proposed rate cuts.
104
 
While Arizona did not entirely ignore § 30(A)’s quality prong, the state, 
CMS, and the court devoted most of its attention to access.
105
 Arizona’s 
quality findings were brief, consisting almost entirely of a reiteration of the 
effects its new access monitoring system would have on quality, its 
willingness to transport geographically-isolated beneficiaries to accessible 
providers, and a declaration that its overall mission was to provide 
“comprehensive, quality health care for all of its members.”
106
 The court 
found that the federal agency’s consideration complied with § 30(A) merely 
because “there [was] evidence in the record that CMS addressed quality.”
107
 
HHS recently issued administrative guidance that further illustrates 
the near-singular focus on access in rate setting. In 2011, HHS issued a 
proposed rule in response to the lack of agency guidance on Medicaid rate 
setting and § 30(A).
108
 The proposed rule, however, is based on the 
MACPAC report that California relied on in Managed Pharmacy Care.
109
 As 
such, the proposal is entirely concerned with access.
110
 To ensure compliance 
with § 30(A), it proposes that prior to reducing reimbursement rates, states 
must submit to CMS “access reviews” that take into account (1) enrollee 
needs, (2) provider availability, and (3) utilization of services.
111
 The 
proposed rule eschews methodologies that focus primarily on providers’ 
costs, “recogniz[ing] that access to covered services is affected by multiple 
factors,” including demographic differences and local market conditions.
112
 
As such, HHS’s proposed rule allows states to evaluate access levels using a 
wide variety of data measures, thus permitting “State and Federal review of 
beneficiary access to evolve over time and for States to implement effective 
and efficient approaches and solutions that are appropriate to their local and 
perhaps changing circumstances.”
113
 The proposed regulation, therefore, is 
                                                 
104 Ariz. Hosp. & Health Care Ass’n, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 986. 
105 See id.at 993–94 (exhibiting the state and CMS’s, as well as the reviewing 
court’s, concentration on access). 
106 Id. at 995 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
107 Id. 
108 Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (proposing a framework addressing access due to the lack of 
agency guidance in interpreting § 30(A)). 
109 Id. at 26344–45; MACPAC, MARCH 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
MEDICAID AND CHIP, at 125–27 (Mar. 2011), http://www.macpac.gov/reports (follow March 
2011 Report) (discussing the framework proposed for examining Medicaid beneficiaries’ 
access to care). 
110 Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (proposing an access-focused framework to interpreting             
§ 30(A)’s requirements). 
111 Id. at 26344–45; MACPAC, MARCH 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
MEDICAID AND CHIP, at 125–27 (delineating the factors associated with the proposed access 
reviews). 
112 Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26344. 
113 Id. at 26344–47. 
17
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not a bright line rule, and has been criticized for its narrow scope, ambiguity, 
and insufficient lack of focus on providers’ costs.
114
 Whether effective or 
not, however, the proposed rule is consistent with the access-centric 
approach to rate setting. 
C.  Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Secretary U.S. Department of HHS 
In Christ the King, the Third Circuit analyzed Pennsylvania’s 
nursing home rate adjustment under the quality prong of § 30(A), in marked 
contrast to the access-centric approach employed by courts both pre- and 
post-Douglas.
115
 Christ the King correctly recognizes quality is, as the 
statutory language clearly indicates, a standalone factor that CMS must 
assess independent of access.
116
 As such, it provides guidance to states, 
CMS, and plaintiffs regarding the state and federal agencies’ obligation to 
independently assess the quality prong of § 30(A) in rate suits initiated under 
the APA. This section discusses the factual and procedural history of the case 
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion. 
1.  Factual and Procedural History 
Pennsylvania reimburses public and private Medicaid-participating 
nursing facilities under the so-called “case-mix” prospective payment 
system.
117
 Under this system, the Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare (PDPW) determines each facility’s per diem rate based on a 
calculation that takes into account the costs necessary to run a Medicaid 
nursing facility.
118
 Because the costs of providing care to Medicaid patients 
have continuously risen, payments to such facilities under the case-mix 
system have risen as well.
119
 In an effort to curb rising costs, since 2005, 
Pennsylvania has consistently applied a budget adjustment factor (BAF) to 
                                                 
114 See Peter Nozicka, The Equal Access Provision: A Destiny of Ambiguity, 21 
ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 22, 33 (2011) (noting that the proposed rule is 
narrow in scope because it only applies to fee-for-service pricing arrangements, not managed 
care, and that, while the equal access provision of § 30(A) focuses on access as regards other 
populations in the same geographic locations, the proposed rule focuses on beneficiaries’ 
needs and provider availability); Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 840 
(lamenting that “[n]owhere in the three-part MACPAC framework adopted by HHS does it 
explicitly include provider cost studies or data as a measure of access or payment 
sufficiency”). 
115 Christ the King, 730 F.3d 291. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the access-
centric approach exhibited by most courts pre- and post-Douglas). 
116 Id. at 309–14 (analyzing Pennsylvania’s failure to examine of the rate 
adjustment’s effect on quality of care). 
117 Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 298; Christ the King Manor v. Com., Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare, 911 A.2d 624, 630 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (discussing the case-mix system). The 
case-mix system has been in place since 1996. Id. 
118 Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 298. PDPW takes into account such factors as “the 
acuity level of residents” and the “allowable costs” that facilities incur. Id. 
119 Id. at 298–99. 
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the case-mix rates that decreases reimbursement rates by a certain 
percentage.
120
 As explained by the Third Circuit, “if a case-mix rate of $100 
was multiplied by a BAF of 0.900, the resulting reimbursement rate would 
be $90, or 10% less than what was called for by the case-mix calculation.”
121
 
Using the BAF, reimbursement rates declined by nearly 2% from 2005 to 
2007.
122
 
In 2008, PDPW submitted an SPA to CMS, seeking federal approval 
to apply a BAF for 2008–2009 because the BAF for 2007–2008 was set to 
expire soon.
123
 The new BAF decreased the case-mix rate for private nursing 
homes by 9.109%.
124
 However, because the costs of providing care to 
Medicaid patients under the case-mix methodology continued to rise, total 
payments to such facilities were estimated to increase by 1% after 
application of the BAF.
125
 While the SPA was under review, the CMS 
employee responsible for evaluating the state’s SPAs contacted PDPW, 
inquiring as to whether the new BAF would decrease overall nursing facility 
rates, as he believed the SPA indicated.
126
 PDPW assured the employee that 
any such indication was incorrect.
127
 Thereafter convinced, based on a 
spreadsheet provided by PDPW, that implementation of the proposed SPA 
would actually result in higher nursing home rates than if it were not 
approved, the employee recommended approval of the SPA, which CMS 
gave in December of 2008.
128
 
Nursing homes brought suit against HHS and PDPW in 2009 under 
the APA and the Supremacy Clause, alleging that the state violated § 30(A) 
because it did not provide CMS with any evidence indicating the BAF’s 
effect on nursing home residents’ quality of care.
129
 The district court 
disagreed and upheld CMS’s approval, “[a]ccording significant deference to 
[CMS’s] interpretation of the Medicaid Act.”
130
 On appeal, the Third Circuit 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 298. 
122 Id. at 299 (noting that reimbursement rates to participating nursing home 
facilities decreased by cutting 4.878%  in 2005 and 6.806% by 2007). 
123 Id. at 300. PDPW submitted two SPAs, one concerning public nursing 
facilities, the other concerning private nursing facilities. Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 300 n.8. 
However, the Third Circuit only discussed the private nursing facilities SPA because plaintiffs 
waived their ability to argue the validity of the other SPA when they failed to issue a specific 
objection to that SPA at trial and on appeal. Id. 
124 Id. at 301–02. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 301. 
127 Id. 
128 Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 301–02. This belief was a misunderstanding for, if 
CMS failed to approve the SPA, the current BAF would expire and the case-mix rate would 
go unreduced. Id. at 301 n.12. 
129 Id. at 302; Opening Brief of Appellants at 28, Christ the King Manor v. 
Baldock Assoc., 2012 WL 5986894 (3d Cir. 2013). 
130 Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 304–05 (citing Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 2012 WL 3027543, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. 2012)). 
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Court of Appeals reversed, finding CMS’s review of Pennsylvania’s SPA 
“arbitrary and capricious” under the APA.
131
 
2.  Third Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that CMS’s approval of 
PDPW’s SPA violated § 30(A) because the state agency did not specify in its 
SPA application how it settled on the specific BAF at issue.
132
 The court also 
held that the state failed to specify how the new BAF “allows for rates 
‘consistent with’” § 30(A), specifically concentrating on quality of care.
133
 
Whereas prior Third Circuit § 30(A) state defendants had supplied CMS with 
data from studies analyzing proposed rate adjustments’ effects, stakeholder 
input, comparative data from other states, and other evidence in support of 
their SPAs, the administrative record here was “remarkably thin.”
134
 The 
state’s submission to CMS consisted of a cover letter, an SPA submittal 
form, notices published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin announcing the 
proposed BAF, a chart indicating the state’s Medicaid costs, a description of 
the proposed BAF, and the calculation used to determine it.
135
 Nowhere in its 
application did PDPW explain how the rates would affect quality of care.
136
 
CMS maintained that its approval of Pennsylvania’s SPA was not 
arbitrary and capricious.
137
 CMS supported this argument by citing (1) the 
lack of any quality concerns associated with previous BAFs, (2) the 
projected 1% increase in reimbursement rates under the proposed BAF, (3) 
other statutory sources that assure adequate quality of nursing home care, 
and (4) assurances by the state agency that the proposed BAF complied with 
§ 30(A).
138
 
The court was not persuaded by CMS’s reliance on the state’s past 
use of the BAF methodology: 
The obvious flaw in that argument is that earlier adjustments 
do not reveal how a later and different adjustment may 
change a system already affected by the earlier adjustments. 
The fifth blow to a boxer’s chin may be no more forceful 
than the previous four, but still be forceful enough to shatter 
a weakened jaw. And if the fifth blow is more forceful, a “no 
worries” mindset is even less warranted. The [proposed] 
                                                 
131 Id. at 305. 
132 Id. at 309. 
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 309, 301. 
136 In fact, the Third Circuit’s description of the record as “thin” may have been 
too generous given that the phrase “quality of care” appeared nowhere in the administrative 
record. See Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 129, at 28. 
137 Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 309. 
138 Id. at 309, 312. 
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adjustment of 9.109% is not necessarily the same in its 
impact as the 6.806% adjustment [previously adopted].
139
 
Therefore, previous rates’ effects on quality do not provide sufficient 
evidence of currently proposed rates’ effects on quality because “[i]t is 
simply not reasonable to conclude that, because prior cuts did not seem too 
painful, a deeper cut would not hurt.”
140
 
Regarding the second argument, the court found CMS’s assertion 
that the proposed BAF’s projected 1% increase evidenced a lack of any 
decrease in nursing home quality misguided.
141
 CMS approved the SPA 
based, in part, on its conclusion that the proposed BAF was responsible for 
the projected rate increase.
142
 The court found this conclusion exhibited a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the state’s ratemaking methodology.
143
 The 
BAF would not cause an overall rate increase, but rather would stymie an 
otherwise larger increase under the case-mix rate absent a cap on growth.
144
 
Were the SPA not implemented after the then-current BAF expired, the case-
mix rate would not be adjusted.
145
 
The court was similarly unimpressed with CMS’s reliance on other 
statutory assurances of quality.
146
 The state contended that the federal 
Nursing Home Reform Act’s conditions for certification, and nursing homes’ 
duties under state law to provide quality care, were sufficient to ensure 
PDPW’s SPA would not negatively affect quality.
147
 The court, however, 
wrote that depending on other statutory sources to ensure quality would 
“nullif[y] [CMS’s] review process under [§ 30(A)],” and “ignores fiscal 
realities by implying that a state can continue to assure quality of care by 
holding nursing homes to high standards while simultaneously underfunding 
them.
”148
 
Finally, the Third Circuit rejected CMS’s “unsupported assertion that 
its [SPA] meets [§] 30(A)’s requirements . . . .”
149
 Noting that states have 
flexibility under the Medicaid Act in adjusting provider rates, the court 
reminded the agency that such flexibility is not limitless.
150
 Section 30(A) 
“gives teeth to the [SPA] approval process,” requiring something more than 
                                                 
139 Id. at 311. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 310 
142 Id. 
143 Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 310. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 311–12. 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 312. 
149 Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 312 
150 Id. 
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unsupported, conclusory statements.
151
 Any contrary interpretation would 
render the statute “a dead letter.”
152
 
CMS’s reliance on past rate adjustments and other statutory 
provisions, misunderstanding of the state’s rate setting methodology, and 
conclusory statements in support of the SPA’s positive effects on quality 
ultimately failed to convince the Third Circuit that CMS complied with the 
quality prong of § 30(A) when it approved Pennsylvania’s SPA.
153
 In Christ 
the King, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first post-Douglas 
decision that invalidated rate adjustments under the APA. The opinion, 
however, is even more significant in that its discussion focused almost 
exclusively on quality, as opposed to access.
154
 Christ the King indicates that  
§ 30(A)’s quality prong is an independent factor in rate reviews going 
forward, especially when the affected providers consist of institutions that, 
like nursing homes, are not at risk of leaving the Medicaid program due to 
their favorable status under the Medicaid Act.
155
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Christ the King stands for the proposition that states and CMS must 
treat quality as the truly independent factor of § 30(A) that it is.
156
 
Anomalous in its focus on quality, the Third Circuit’s discussion provides 
helpful guidelines for states and CMS going forward.
157
 While Christ the 
King is unlikely to bring an end to litigants’ access arguments, especially 
when the plaintiffs consist of providers other than, for example, nursing 
homes, states and CMS should keep in mind its emphasis on quality of care 
                                                 
151 Id. at 312–13. 
152 Id. at 313. 
153 Id. at 309–14. 
154 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the pre- and post-Douglas access-centric 
approach to § 30(A)). 
155 See Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community 
Care: Lessons from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938–40 (explaining the 
Medicaid Act’s institutional bias towards nursing homes exhibited by the fact that Medicaid 
substantially funds nursing homes and was intended by Congress to direct beneficiaries into 
nursing homes for the provision of long-term care). One million out of 1.5 million nursing 
home residents receive Medicaid. FURROW, supra note 9, at 140. About half of all national 
expenditures concerning long-term care stem from Medicaid. William Pipal, You Don’t Have 
to Go Home, But You Can’t Stay Here: The Current State of Federal Nursing Home 
Involuntary Discharge Laws, 20 ELDER L. J. 235, 244 (2012). 
156 See supra text accompanying note 155 (explaining that Christ the King’s focus 
on quality indicates that reviewing agencies and courts must account for quality of care when 
analyzing compliance with § 30(A)). 
157 See infra Part III.A–C (discussing the guidelines provided by the Christ the 
King decision). 
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in the event that Christ the King spurs more active judicial inquiry into 
defendants’ assessments of quality.
 158
 
Pennsylvania’s rate adjustments were not upheld despite the 
deferential review afforded rate decisions under the APA.
159
 This should 
provide warning to states and CMS to seriously consider all of § 30(A)’s 
factors when making and reviewing changes to Medicaid provider 
payments.
160
 Christ the King, however, also provides specific guidance 
concerning state assessments of quality.
161
 Finding CMS’s reliance on an 
SPA that did not discuss the quality prong of § 30(A) “arbitrary and 
capricious,” the Third Circuit emphasized the need for independent 
examination of state rate adjustments’ effects on quality by the state, and a 
concomitant duty on the part of CMS to require such an examination.
162
 This 
overall theme is embedded in the court’s discrete responses to CMS’s blatant 
disregard for the lack of any quality assessment by Pennsylvania, and the 
agency’s reliance on independent assurances of, and past rate adjustments’ 
effects on, quality.
163
 
A.  Quality Analysis 
One of Christ the King’s most important, and perhaps obvious, 
guidelines is that states must include an assessment of quality in their SPA 
submissions.
164
 Issues of access may more directly affect providers that do 
not receive as substantial funding from Medicaid as do nursing homes; 
however, issues regarding the quality of health care provided obviously 
concern more than simply nursing homes.
165
 In any event, Pennsylvania’s 
                                                 
158 See infra text accompanying and note 165 (explaining that nursing homes’ 
beneficial status under the Medicaid Act renders them at low risk of leaving the Medicaid 
program). 
159 See Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 314 (stating that “from the record there was no 
reasoned basis for the agency’s decision” and therefore the approval of PDPW’s SPA was 
“arbitrary and capricious”). 
160 See supra Part II.C.2 (illustrating that the Christ the King decision indicates 
that all of § 30(A)’s factors, including quality, must be assessed by states and the federal 
government in reviewing rate adjustments) (emphasis added). 
161 See infra Part III.A–C (discussing the guidelines provided by the Christ the 
King decision). 
162 See supra text accompanying note 153 (explaining that the Third Circuit in 
Christ the King held that reliance on past rate adjustments and other statutory provisions and 
conclusory statements in support of the SPA’s positive effects on quality are no substitutes for 
actual review of an SPA’s effects on quality of care). 
163 See supra II.C.2 (discussing the court’s disapproval of the state’s quality 
analysis demanded by § 30(A) in Christ the King). 
164 See supra Part II.C.2 (stating that the Christ the King court held that CMS’s 
review of Pennsylvania’s SPA was arbitrary and capricious because it did not discuss how the 
adjustment affected quality of care). 
165 See supra text accompanying note 9 (noting that quality of care implicates all 
provider settings and patient experiences). 
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SPA provided no individual examination of quality.
166
 Plaintiffs are not 
generally concerned with issues of economy and efficiency, factors that 
impose a nebulous federal ceiling on Medicaid reimbursement rates.
167
 
Therefore, the effects on quality of care in nursing homes was the only         
§ 30(A) issue implicated by Pennsylvania’s SPA.
168
 Even so, the state did not 
discuss quality, and CMS approved the state’s SPA regardless.
169
 
The obvious lesson for states and reviewing agencies is, then, to 
include, and require, an assessment of quality in SPAs. Measuring quality, of 
course, is not an easy task.
170
 The Third Circuit made clear, however, that 
conclusory, unsupported assurances of quality will not suffice.
171
 In the 
nursing home context, institutions regularly collect data measuring resident 
satisfaction.
172
 Also, CMS provides nursing home quality ratings on its 
Nursing Home Compare website.
173
 The website reviews nursing homes 
based on a “Five-Star Quality Rating System” both as to a nursing home’s 
overall score, and as to health inspections, staffing, and “quality measures” 
(QMs).
174
 The website contains general “nursing home information” for each 
institution that indicates whether the nursing home participates in 
Medicaid.
175
 
States should use data from, or of the sort compiled on, Nursing 
Home Compare to measure the quality levels of its nursing homes and other 
                                                 
166 See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining that Pennsylvania’s SPA contained an 
inadequate examination of quality of care as required by § 30(A)). 
167 See supra text accompanying note 61(explaining that § 30(A)’s first two 
factors set the federal ceiling). 
168 See supra Part II.C.1 (writing that the plaintiffs in Christ the King brought suit 
due to the state and federal agencies’ lack of assessment of the adjustment’s effects on 
quality). 
169 See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that CMS approved Pennsylvania’s SPA even 
though the submission did not discuss quality). 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 73–75 (explaining that quality is a difficult 
concept to define and measure). 
171 See supra Part II.C.2 (reviewing the Christ the King court’s rejection of CMS’s 
unsupported assertions that the SPA comported with § 30(A)). 
172 See, e.g., Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Nursing Home Quality Initiative, 
CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/
NursingHomeQualityInits/index.html?redirect=/NursingHomeQualityInits (last updated Apr. 
4, 2014) (providing “consumer and provider information regarding the quality of care in 
nursing homes”). 
173 Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/nursing
homecompare (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
174 Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Five-Star Quality Rating System, 
CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/Certification
andComplianc/FSQRS.html (last updated Apr. 20, 2014) (describing the “Five-Star Quality 
Rating System”). QMs consist of “physical and clinical measures for nursing home residents” 
collected by nursing homes. Id 
175 See, e.g., Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov
/nursinghomecompare/profile.html#profTab=0&ID=265672&loc=63109&lat=38.5844193&ln
g=-90.2948797 (last visited May 12, 2014) (providing general information on a nursing home 
located in St. Louis, Missouri). 
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similarly situated long-term care institutions and services. Nursing Home 
Compare evaluates nursing homes’ staffing levels by assessing the number 
of residents in each respective institution and the number of nurse and 
physical therapist (PT) staff hours expended per resident per day.
176
 The 
number of hours expended by registered nurses, licensed practical and 
licensed vocational nurses, certified nursing assistants, and PTs per resident 
per day is calculated by dividing the number of hours worked by 
professionals in each respective group two weeks before inspection by the 
number of residents.
177
 
Each nursing home’s recent health inspection information is posted 
on Nursing Home Compare.
178
 Inspection results are divided into the 
following categories: health deficiencies, fire safety deficiencies, and 
complaints and facility-reported incidents.
179
 Health deficiencies are further 
categorized by mistreatment deficiencies, quality care deficiencies, resident 
right deficiencies, nutrition and dietary deficiencies, pharmacy services 
deficiencies, and environmental deficiencies. The data for an institution’s 
health deficiencies includes the date of the last health inspection and a copy 
of the full inspection report, the dates of complaint inspections, the total 
number of health deficiencies found in the institution, and the average 
number of health deficiencies found in the state in which the institution is 
located, as well of the entire country.
180
 
QMs are divided into those measures affecting long-term (“long 
stay”) residents, and those affecting short-term (“short stay”) residents.
181 
There are thirteen long stay resident QMs, including the percentage of long-
term residents who: (1) have experienced one or more falls resulting in major 
injury; (2) were physically restrained; (3) lost too much weight; (4) have 
depressive symptoms; and (5) have or had a catheter inserted and left in their 
bladder.
182
 Short-stay QMs consist of the percentage of short-term residents 
who: (1) self-report moderate to severe pain; (2) have new or worsened 
pressure ulcers; (3) were appropriately given seasonal influenza vaccination; 
(4) were appropriately given pneumococcal vaccination; and (5) have been 
recently prescribed antipsychotic medication.
183
 
The foregoing data metrics could prove useful to states in assessing 
the present quality levels of institutional providers, or at the very least of 
                                                 
176 See, e.g., id. (providing staffing analysis on a nursing home located in St. 
Louis, Missouri). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/
nursinghomecompare/profile.html#profTab=1&ID=265600&loc=63109&lat=38.5844193&ln
g=-90.2948797 (last visited May 12, 2014). 
181 Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov
/NursingHomeCompare/About/Quality-Measures-Info.html (last visited May 12, 2014). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
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nursing homes, and in predicting future rate adjustments’ effects on such 
levels. Due to its focus on nursing homes, information of this nature may not 
prove as useful in evaluating the quality of care provided by individual 
providers. In any event, it is likely, given their favorable treatment under the 
Medicaid Act, that institutional long-term care providers will be the most 
likely to bring quality of care claims.
184
 
States may also measure quality by patient satisfaction or outcome 
data, or other measurements. Regardless of the data gathered and assessed, 
however, the submission of studies and analyses on quality is necessary.
185
 
Therefore, states would do well to formulate quality assessment procedures 
and guidelines in order to prevent judicial invalidation of CMS’s approval of 
rate adjustments.
186
 A website like Nursing Home Compare would have 
provided Pennsylvania useful information in studying and assessing its rate 
adjustment’s effects on the quality levels of its nursing homes. 
B.  Independent Assurances of Quality 
Christ the King also provided that, whatever data states use to 
analyze rate reductions’ effects on quality of care, quality standards imposed 
by other sources are not sufficient substitutes for independent assessment.
187
 
Pennsylvania relied, in part, on the Nursing Home Reform Act’s survey and 
certification provisions, and comparative state monitoring requirements, in 
arguing that its SPA would not have a negative impact on quality.
188
 The 
Third Circuit’s opinion, however, indicates that § 30(A) requires an 
independent analysis on the part of the state into each specific rate 
adjustment’s impact on quality of care.
189
 This implies that the whole range 
of quality improvement mechanisms used by states and providers in 
achieving quality of care, such as regulations, credentialing actions, risk 
management procedures, market competition, and other tools are not enough, 
alone, to satisfy compliance with § 30(A)’s quality prong.
 
                                                 
184 See supra text accompanying note 155 (noting that nursing homes receive 
favorable treatment under Medicaid). 
185 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the finding in Christ the King that 
Pennsylvania’s SPA was arbitrary and capricious because it did not contain a discussion of its 
effect on quality of care). 
186 See text accompanying notes 146–148 (discussing the court’s rejection of 
CMS’s reliance on other statutory assurances of quality in Christ the King). 
187 See text accompanying notes 146–148 (discussing Christ the King’s rejection 
of CMS’s reliance on statutory assurances of quality other than § 30(A)). 
188 See text accompanying notes 146–148 (discussing CMS’s statutory arguments 
in Christ the King). 
189 See text accompanying notes 146–148 (discussing Christ the King’s rejection 
of CMS’s reliance on statutory assurances of quality other than § 30(A)). 
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C.  Past Quality Rates 
Lastly, Christ the King indicates that the lack of evidence of prior 
rate adjustments’ negative effects on quality does not satisfy § 30(A), even if 
the current rate adjustments are devised by the same methodology and 
prompted by the same concerns as were those implemented previously.
190
 
The past effects of rate adjustments are certainly helpful in assessing the 
possible effects of future rates, just as the efficacy rates of independent 
quality improvement mechanisms are helpful in assessing the current state of 
a patient’s quality of care. As with reliance on independent quality tools, 
however, a lack of decline in quality rates from prior adjustments does not 
indicate that a new round of adjustments will not have a detrimental effect.
191
 
Citing a history of a lack of detrimental effects on quality is no substitute for 
a responsible degree of investigation and analysis by the state.
192
 
Christ the King indicates that § 30(A) requires independent 
assessment of quality.
193
 It implies that, of the hundreds of pages submitted 
by California in support of the rate cuts upheld in Managed Pharmacy Care, 
some pages should have explicitly discussed the cuts’ effects on quality of 
care.
194
 Christ the King also implies that Arizona, in Arizona Hospital & 
Healthcare Ass’n v. Betlach, should have focused more of its resources on 
evaluating the independent effects of its cuts on quality.
195
 Further, Christ the 
King indicates that, instead of promulgating a regulation that focuses 
exclusively on access, HHS should consider providing guidance as to how 
states should assess quality as well.
196
 States need to gather and assess data 
metrics that allow them to determine the extent to which quality of care will 
be affected by the imposition of rate changes. This requires that states rely on 
up-to-date, not past, data, and something more than independent or 
unsupported assurances of quality. 
                                                 
190 See text accompanying notes 139–140 (discussing Christ the King’s rejection 
of CMS’s argument that past rate adjustments’ effects on quality are sufficient to satisfy         
§ 30(A)’s mandate). 
191 See text accompanying notes 139–140. (discussing Christ the King’s 
assessment that previous rates’ effects on quality do not sufficiently evidence current rate 
proposals’ effects on quality). 
192 See text accompanying notes 139–140. 
193 See supra text accompanying notes 164–171 (discussing the need to analyze 
quality after Christ the King). 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 101–103 (discussing the Managed 
Pharmacy Care case). 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 104–107 (discussing Ariz. Hosp. & Health 
Care Ass’n). 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 108–114 (discussing the proposed 
regulation based on the MACPAC report). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas, 
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have pursued alleged § 30(A) 
violations under the APA’s judicial review provisions.
197
 Christ the King, a 
product of Douglas, stands for the proposition that courts reviewing § 30(A) 
APA claims must inquire into the state and federal agencies’ assessments of 
quality.
198
 Measuring quality of care is a complicated issue that would 
benefit from guidance by CMS or the utilization of tools such as Nursing 
Home Compare.
199
 No matter the metrics used, states must analyze and 
report on quality, lest they risk invalidation of their SPAs as Pennsylvania 
did in Christ the King.
200
 Quality is an independent factor of § 30(A), and it 
appears that the courts may be beginning to acknowledge this fact. 
 
                                                 
197 See supra Part II.B (discussing the current state of rate setting litigation). 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 164–171 (discussing the need for analyzing 
quality after Christ the King). 
199 See supra texts accompanying notes 172–175 (discussing Medicaid.gov’s 
Nursing Home Compare website). 
200 See supra Part III.A (discussing the need to analyze quality of care to comply 
with § 30(A) after Christ the King). 
28
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 38 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss1/3
